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EVALUATING THE PROGRESS OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS
ON THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CONSTITUTION
Penelope Andrews*
Good Morning!
My mandate on this panel is to evaluate five years of the Final South
African Constitution by focusing on the pursuit of women's rights in South
Africa.' This is an immense topic that requires far more time than I have. I
will therefore just touch on some broad themes and sketch the major points.
Hopefully, we can pursue them more deeply during the discussion period.
In my presentation I will first briefly discuss the major sections of the
Constitution, which deal with gender equality.2 Second, I would like to
examine the Constitutional Court's approach to equality, specifically,
gender equality. Third, I will outline some statutes enacted by the South
African Parliament in light of the constitutional mandate that benefit
women directly. Finally, I will discuss some of the limitations on using a
judicial approach to the enforcement of rights, as opposed to pursuit of
rights in the legislative policy, administrative policy, and other arenas. This
involves a reference to the major obstacles to women's rights in South
Africa and an examination of what role the Constitution and the Constitutional Court can play in relation to minimizing or removing those
obstacles.3
The most significant provisions relating to gender equality are outlined
very clearly in section 9 of the Bill of Rights of South Africa's Constitution.
As my colleague Professor DeVos mentions, the Constitution is expansive

* Penelope Andrews, B.A.. LL.B. (Natal), LL.M. (Columbia); Stoneman Visiting Professor
of Law and Democracy, Albany Law School; Associate Professor, City University of New York School
of Law. A special thanks to Mark Kende for organizing the panel.
I. For a comprehensive survey of women's rights see generally GENDER AND THE NEW
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER (Christina Murray ed., 1994); THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA
FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE (Sandra Liebenberg ed.. 1995); PUTTING WOMEN ON THE AGENDA

(Susan Bazilli ed.. 1990).
2. For a comprehensive discussion of women's rights and the Constitution, see Penelope E.
Andrews, The Stepchild of National Liberation: Women and Rights in South Africa, in THE POST
APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH AFRICA'S BASIC LAW 326 (Penelope Andrews

& Stephen Ellmann eds., 2001).
3. For a discussion of some obstacles to women's rights, see Penelope E. Andrews, Violence
Against Women in South Africa: The Role of Culture and the Limitations of the Law, 8 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 25 (1999). See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SOUTH
AFRICA (1995).
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and very generous.4 Indeed, the South African Constitution has been
admired widely for the range of protections it affords.5 Section 9 contains a
very broad mandate to pursue gender equality and to remove unlawful
discrimination. 6 This section outlines a general commitment to equality
before the law and equal protection under the law. It also provides several
grounds on which the state may not unfairly discriminate, directly or
indirectly. Some of the grounds include race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, and sexual orientation.!
There are a few factors worth noting with respect to the language of
section 9. These are particularly interesting when compared to the situation
as it pertains to the United States. The first factor that stands out is the
language of this section, which suggests that discrimination against women
in South Africa is just as constitutionally suspect as discrimination on the
basis of race. This is a firmer stance than is taken by the American courts,
which subject gender discrimination to intermediate scrutiny and race
discrimination to strict scrutiny.!
The second issue worth noting is the prohibition on direct and indirect
discrimination. This is an implicit acknowledgment of the tenacity and the
invidiousness of institutionalized discrimination. 9
The third issue worth highlighting is that section 9 acknowledges the
intersectionality of different grounds of discrimination.10 This is particularly important when redressing discrimination against black women
because they suffer from multiple forms of discrimination. In one of the
earliest equality cases before the Constitutional Court, Judge Goldstone
noted that there is often a complex relationship between specified
grounds." The temptation to force them into neatly self-contained categories should be resisted.

4. Pierre de Vos. South Africa's Constitutional Court: Starry-eyed in the Face ofHistory?. 26
VT. L. REv. 837 (2002).
5. Craig Scott & Phillip AIston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational
Context: a Comment on Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom 's Promise, 16 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS.

206.211-12 (2000).
6. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 § 9.
7. Id. § 9(3).
8. The intermediate scrutiny standard was pronounced in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976). The strict scrutiny standard was pronounced in Korematsu v. US., 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944).
9. Diane Majury. Strategizing in Equality, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L. J. 169,179-80 (1987).
10. For a comprehensive discussion of the intersection of race and gender, see Penelope E.
Andrews, Human Rights, Globalization and Critical Race Feminism: Voices from the Margins. 3 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 373 (2000); see also, Adrien Wing & Eunice Carvalho. Black South African
Women: Towards Equal Rights. 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 8 (1995).
II. President of the Republic of S. Aft. v. Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC). 1997 SACLR
LEXIS 91 1997 (4) SALR I (CC).
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The fourth issue is the constitutional mandate for affirmative action,
which in effect shields affirmative action programs from constitutional
challenges. 2 The other sections in the Bill of Rights are very clear
concerning violence against women. Section 12, for example, provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which
includes the right . . . to be free from all forms of violence from either
public or private sources."' 13 1 have provided a brief constitutional sketch
describing the major sections that provide the promise for gender equality
and the grounds for fighting discrimination.
Now surprisingly, or maybe not surprisingly, since 1995 the Constitutional Court has heard fourteen equality cases and only three involved
gender.' 4 These cases, to a large extent, demonstrate that it has not been the
most historically disadvantaged South Africans who have thus far invoked
the protection of the equality provision.1 5 In fact, the most important
gender equality case was not brought under the rubric of gender equality,
but rather involved social and economic rights. 16 My colleague Professor
Klug discusses this case. 17 Of the three gender equality cases heard by the
Constitutional Court, two have been brought by men who sought the
protection of the equality clause. 18 One case was brought by a relatively

12. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 § 9(2) provides that: "To promote the achievement of equality,
legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken."
13. Id.§ 12(0)(c).
14. Fraser v. Naude and Another, 1998'(II) BCLR 1357 (CC), 1998 SACLR LEXIS 53; Hugo,
1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC); Brink v. Kitshoff, 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC). 1996 SACLR LEXIS 9; City
Council of Pretoria v. Walker, 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC), 1998 SACLR LEXIS 27; Moseneke & Others
v. Master ofthe High Court, 2001 (2) BCLR 103 (CC), 2000 SACLR LEXIS 87 (2000); Nat'l Coalition
for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC), 1998 SACLR LEXIS
36; Hoffmann v. S. African Airways, 2000 (II) BCLR 1211 (CC), 2000 SACLR LEXIS 127; Harksen
v. Lane NO & Others, 1997(t) BCLR 1489 (CC), 1997 SACLR LEXIS 20; Prinsloo v. Van der Linde &
Another, 1997(6) BCLR 759 (CC); Larbi-Odam & Others v. Member of the Executive Council for
Educ. (North-West Province) & Another 1997, (12) BCLR 1655 (CC), 1997 SACLR LEXIS 39; S. v.
Ntuli. 1996 (1) BCLR 141 (CC), 1995 SACLR LEXIS 299 (1995); Jooste v. Score Supermarket Trading
(Pty) Ltd., 1999(2) BCLR 139 (CC), 1998 SACLR LEXIS 75 (1998); Nat'l Coalition for Gay & Lesbian
Equality & Others v. Minister of Home Affairs & Others, 1999 (3) BCLR 280 (CC), 1999 SACLR
LEXIS 13; Minister of Defense v. Potsane & Another, 2001 (1H) BCLR 1137 (CC), 2001 SACLR
LEXIS 136.
15. This particular point was highlighted during a discussion of the South Africa Reading
Group by Ms. Saras Jagwarth of the University of Cape Town Faculty of Law.
16. See Republic ofS. Afr. v. Grootboom, 2000(1 1) BCLR 1169 (CC). 2000 SACLR LEXIS
126.
17. Heinz Klug, Five Years on: How Relevant is the Constitutionto the New South Africa?, 26
VT. L. REv. 769 (2002).
18. See Fraser, 1998 (1I) BCLR 1357 (CC), at *2; Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC). 2.
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privileged white woman, who stood to lose approximately two million Rand
from an estate. She based her challenge on the equality provision.' 9
These are not problems of the Court itself, but rather are perennial
problems about access to resources, including access to legal services.20
Therefore, these structural limitations have some bearing on who has access
to the courts.
In the equality cases, the Constitutional Court has elaborated at length
what equality means in South Africa.2' As Professor DeVos has pointed
out, the Court has tried to contextualize discrimination in South Africa and
also provided a more substantive definition of equality as opposed to a mere
formalistic approach.22 The Court has also focused
very largely on
23
disparate impact as opposed to strict equal treatment.
One of the first cases on gender equality involved an unmarried father,
who challenged the provisions of the Child Care Act. The Child Care Act
allowed the adoption of children born out of wedlock without the consent of
the father.2 4 For children born in wedlock, the father and mother's consent
was required. The father's challenge in this case was successful in that the
law was declared unconstitutional, but the Constitutional Court, citing the
best interest
of the child, declined to allow further appeal to set aside the
25
adoption.
The second case, one in which I think the Court's analysis provided a
clear blueprint of the approach to equality in South Africa, has been fairly
controversial. This is the Hugo decision in which the applicant, a convicted
26
prisoner, challenged a Presidential pardon issued by President Mandela.
He pardoned certain categories of prisoners, including women in prison
who had children under the age of twelve at the time of South Africa's first
election .27
Hugo challenged the Presidential pardon on the basis that it violated his
constitutional rights to equality and that it discriminated against him on the
19. Brink v. Kitshoff. 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC), at 9-10. One South African Rand is roughly
equal to 9 cents U.S. See XE.com, Universal Currency Converter, at htp://www.xe.comlucc (last
visited Apr. 20, 2002).
20. A. Chaskalson. Law in a Changing Society the Past Ten Years: A Balance Sheet and Some
Indicatorsfor the Future, 5 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 293, 298-99 (1989).
21. See generally Fraser, 1998 (11) BCLR 1357 (CC); Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC); Brink,
1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC).
22. De Vos, supra note 4; see also Pierre De Vos, Grootbroom: the Right ofAccess to Housing
and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness, 17 S.AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 258 (2001).
23. Brink, 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC).
10-11.
24. Child Care Act 74 of 1983, § 18(4)(d).
25. Fraser. 1998(II)BCLR 1357(CC), 3,9-10.
26. Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), 1 1-3.
27. Id., 13, n. 3.

Women's Rights in South Africa

2002]
basis of sex.28

The Court, in its judgment, went through an elaborate

discussion of equality. It then applied the test outlined in the Constitution:
if discrimination is alleged and found on any of the particular grounds, such
as race, gender, and marital status, that finding creates a presumption of
unfairness. 2 9 The person against whom the allegation of discrimination is
made must then rebut the presumption of unfairness by showing the validity
of the action. 30 The Court, in its analysis, looked at the Presidential pardon
and found it to be unfair--the need for the President to rebut the presumption arose. 3 ' It looked at the reasons for the Presidential pardon, including
who would benefit from the pardon. 32 Clearly, children whose mothers or
fathers were in prison benefited.
The Court then examined the other group who benefited from the
pardon-women, the most disadvantaged group in South African society.
The Court acknowledged that mothers are the primary caregivers of
children, but it also recognized that this reinforced a stereotype about
women, child caring, and child rearing. Despite this, the Court adopted a
pragmatic approach and tried to place the issue in the South African
context. It stated that because women have historically been discriminated
against, this approach will benefit them, 33 but it will not perpetuate a disadvantage. The Court found the discrimination valid.
The dissent forcefully challenged the stereotypes the majority opinion
appeared to perpetuate. 34 It stated very clearly that the Constitution is
meant to be transformative. Part of that transformative vision is not to
reinforce old stereotypes, but to pursue a vision in which, in this case,
fathers are also seen as care givers of children. 35 The dissent objected
strongly to the pragmatic approach that the majority took.
The Court considered an alternative, that is, to release fathers of
children under the age of twelve. 36 In assessing this alternative, the Court
noted, first, that there are significantly larger numbers of male prisoners in
South Africa than female prisoners, so the numbers of men who would be
released would be enormous.37 Second, the Court recognized the serious
problem of crime in South Africa and the public outcry that would follow a
28. Id., T3.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9 (5).
Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC). 4.
Id., 66.
Id., 47.
Id., 38.
Id.. 82 (Kriegler, J. dissenting).
Id., 80.
Id., 87.
Id.
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large release of male prisoners.
Interestingly, the Court made this
assumption without providing the empirical data. In fact, this was not an
argument raised by counsel during the course of the proceeding. The
dissenting opinion voiced39 its alarm at the stereotypes that were reinforced in
the majority's judgment.
The Hugo decision, as I said, is very controversial. However, it has
been praised in many quarters specifically for contextualizing women's
oppression in South Africa and the discrimination that women suffer. 4' But
the Court has had difficulty coming to grips with a vision or articulation of
equality that some commentators have argued is inconsistent." I think if
we have time during the discussion we can go through more of the cases. It
is interesting to note that in the race discrimination area, one major case was
an action brought by a white applicant. It involved a challenge to the
provision of services, water, and electricity in his community compared to
those provided for an adjacent black community.4 2 The second was a
challenge brought by one of South Africa's wealthiest males, who happened
to be black, about the racial distinctions in estates, which still pertained in
South Africa at the time the action was brought. 3
Although the parties seeking relief and protection from the Constitutional Court are not from the ranks of the most disadvantaged in South
Africa, one could argue that the Court has comprehensively confronted the
concerns of a large proportion of South Africa's women.44 In addition, the
social and economic rights case that Professor Klug discusses provides a
noteworthy opportunity for pursuing rights that affect the majority of
women in a very real way.
For the brief moments I have left, I would like to consider the major
obstacles to women's equality in South Africa. Some of these obstacles are
implicitly recognized in the Constitution, which provides a detailed framework for redressing them. These obstacles, however, are formidable.

38. Id
39. Id.. 82.
40. Mark Kende, Gender Stereotypes in South African and American ConstitutionalLaw: The
Advantage of a Pragmatic Approach to Equality and Transformation, 117 S.AFR. L. J. 745, 746-47
(2000).
41. See Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt, Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties
in the Development ofan IndigenousJurisprudenceofEquality, 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 248 (1998).
See also D.M. Davis, Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence, 116 S. AFR. L. J. 398 (1999).
42. City Council of Pretoria v. Walker, 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC), 1998 SACLR LEXIS 27.
43. Moseneke & Others v. Master of the High Court, 2001 (2) BCLR 103 (CC). 2000 SACLR
LEXIS 87 (2000).
44. See, e.g., State v. Baloyi, 2000 (2) SALR 425 (CC) (the Court analyzed the issue of
violence against women as one of gender equality).
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The first major impediment to women's equality is violence against
women in South Africa.4" After the elections in 1994, the government
passed legislation to deal with some aspects of the problem, specifically
violence in the private sphere.46 The Constitutional Court has delivered two
47
impressive judgments that confront and analyze violence against women.
What is remarkable is thatthe Court articulates violence against women as a
question of gender equality.
The second obstacle to women's equality is poverty. For a sizeable
proportion of women in South Africa, poverty clearly thwarts their ability
to benefit from the new constitutional mandate. 4 8 Many rights are compromised by women's inability to access economic resources. For example,
the ability to prevent HIV infection, as well as the treatment of AIDS, is
extremely difficult for women who are still caught in a cycle of economic.
dependency and powerlessness.
Finally, there are cultural attitudes which continue to impede women's
rights in a host of areas.4 9 The intransigence of certain cultural attitudes
raises questions about law, and how pursuing legal rights in the courts can
modify cultural attitudes. But I think far more important is the fact that
despite the existence of this wonderful Constitution and despite laudable
efforts by women's groups to incorporate women's rights in the democratic
legal framework, including urging the government to pursue a gendered
legislative agenda, the privatized nature of the South African economy and
the imperatives of a market driven agenda may undermine the transformative possibilities of the Constitution."0 We all know that women suffer
disproportionately from government cutbacks in health, education, social
welfare services, and the like. The constitutional paradigm does not
provide a vehicle to fundamentally challenge governmental economic
policies; it merely operates to ensure that government policy takes account
of its constitutional mandate. The Constitution cannot comprehensively
45. Andrews, supra note 3, at 425-26.
46. For example, The South African Parliament passed the Domestic Violence Act 116 of
1998.
47. See Baloyi, 2000 (I) BCLR 86 (CC); see also Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Security
& Another. 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC), 2001 SACLR LEXIS 47.
48. See FATIMA MEER. Women in the/Apartheid Society, in THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION IN

SOUTH AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY 169 (E.S. Reddy ed., 1992).
49. See Yvonne Mokgoro, Traditional Authority and Democracy in the Interim South African
Constitution. 3 REV. OF CONST. STUD. 60 (1996) (discussing the tension between women's rights and
patriarchal attitudes); see also Penelope E. Andrews. Striking the Rock: Confronting Gender Eqqality in
South Africa. 3 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 307 (1998).
50. A noted American constitutional scholar has outlined the transformative possibilities of the
South African Constitution. See Karl Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 5.
AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 146. 149-0 (1998).
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overturn the deep structural inequalities that face women in South Africa
today; it may, however, force the powers that be not to ignore these
inequalities.

